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ABSTRACT
The importance of network security has grown tremendously and
a collection of devices have been introduced, which can improve
the security of a network. Network intrusion detection systems
(NIDS) are among the most widely deployed such system; popular
NIDS use a collection of signatures of known security threats and
viruses, which are used to scan each packet’s payload. Today,
signatures are often specified as regular expressions; thus the core
of the NIDS comprises of a regular expressions parser, such
parsers are traditionally implemented as finite automata.
Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) are fast, therefore they are
often desirable at high network link rates. DFA for the signatures,
which are used in the current security devices, however require
prohibitive amounts of memory, which limits their practical use.
In this paper, we argue that the traditional DFA based NIDS has
three main limitations: first they fail to exploit the fact that normal
data streams rarely match any virus signature; second, DFAs are
extremely inefficient in following multiple partially matching
signatures and explodes in size, and third finite automaton are
incapable of efficiently keeping track of counts. We propose
mechanisms to solve each of these drawbacks and demonstrate
that our solutions can implement a NIDS much more securely and
economically, and at the same time substantially improve the
packet throughput.

1. INTRODUCTION
Network security has recently received an enormous attention due
to the mounting security concerns in today’s networks. A wide
variety of algorithms have been proposed which can detect and
combat with these security threats. Among all these proposals,
signature based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS)
have been a commercial success and have seen a widespread
adoption. While, these systems already generate several hundreds
of million dollars in revenue, it is projected to rise to more than 2
billion dollars by 2010.
A signature based NIDS maintains a collection of signatures, each
of which characterizes the profile of a known security threat (e.g.
a virus, or a DoS attack). These signatures are used to parse the
data streams of various flows traversing through the network link;
when a flow matches a signature, appropriate action is taken (e.g.
block the flow or rate limit it). Traditionally, security signatures
have been specified as string based exact match, however regular
expressions are now replacing them due to their superior
expressive power and flexibility. Today, regular expression is the
language of choice in NIDS from 3Com, TippingPoint [20] and
Cisco [21], as well as open source NIDS Snort [5], and Bro [4].

When regular expressions are used to specify the signatures in a
NIDS, then finite automaton are typically employed to implement
them. There are two types of finite automaton: Nondeterministic
Finite Automaton (NFA) and Deterministic Finite Automaton
(DFA) [2]. Unlike NFA, DFA requires only one state traversal per
character therefore yields higher parsing rates. Additionally, DFA
maintains a single state of execution at any point, thus they reduce
the “per flow” parse state, which has to be maintained due to the
packet multiplexing in network links. Consequently, DFA is the
preferred method for regular expression matching in NIDS.
DFAs are fast, however for the current signature sets comprising
of hundreds of regular expressions, they require prohibitive
amounts of memory. Current solutions often divide a signature set
into multiple subsets, and construct a DFA for each of them.
However, multiple DFAs require multiple state traversals which
reduce the throughput. It also increases the “per flow” parse state;
with millions of flows in a high speed network link, such increase
is undesirable. Besides, large “per flow” parse state may create a
performance bottleneck because the parse state may have be
loaded and stored for every packet due to the packet multiplexing.
The problems associated with the traditional DFA based regular
expressions implementation stems from three prime factors. First,
traditional approach takes no interest in exploiting the fact that
normal data streams rarely match more than first few symbols of
any signature. In such situations, if one constructs a DFA for the
entire signatures, then most portions of the DFA will be unvisited,
thus the approach of keeping the entire automaton active appears
wasteful; we call this deficiency insomnia. Second, a DFA usually
maintains a single state of execution, due to which it is unable to
efficiently follow the progress of multiple partial matches. They
employ a separate state for each such combination of partial
match, thus the number of states can explode combinatorially. It
appears that if one equips an automaton with a small auxiliary
memory which it will use to register the events of partial matches,
then a combinatorial explosion can be avoided; we refer to this
drawback of a DFA as amnesia. Third, DFA is inefficient in
counting; for example a DFA will require 4 billion states to
implement a 32-bit counter. We call this deficiency acalulia.
In this paper, we propose solutions to tackle each of these three
drawbacks. We propose mechanisms to split signatures such that,
only one portion needs to remain active, while the remaining
portions can be put to sleep under normal conditions. We also
propose a cure to amnesia, by introducing a new machine, which
is as fast as DFA, but requires much fewer number of states. Our
final cure to acalulia extends this machine, so that it can handle
events of counting much more efficiently.

Our three cures are orthogonal to each other and can be applied in
unison. Hence, we propose a packet processing ASIC architecture,
which implements current signatures very economically; the entire
parser requires a few thousand states. It also requires a single state
traversal per character during normal conditions, thus enabling
high parsing rates. There are special protection mechanisms in
place to cope up with the anomalous conditions and DoS attacks.
Additionally, our architecture also ensures that the “per flow”
state, which has to be loaded and stored for every packet, is small;
thus, it can provide very high speed packet processing rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Background
on NIDS and regular expressions are present in Section 2. Section
3 explains about the drawbacks of traditional regular expressions
implementations. Our cure to insomnia is presented in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the cure to amnesia, while section 6 presents
the cure to acalulia. Section 7 presents the experimental results
and the paper ends with concluding remarks in Section 8.

2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
NIDS are now a popular method to employ security mechanisms
within the network. Several commercial network equipments
devices, including Cisco and 3Com have supplied their own NIDS
and a number of smaller players have introduced pattern matching
ASICs which goes inside these NIDS. In fact, many had argue that
“Deep packet inspection will happen in the ASICs, and that
ASICs need to be modified” [19].
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems (NIDS/NIPS)
generally scan the packet header and payload in order to identify a
given set of signatures of well known security threats. Layer 7
firewalls which provide content-based filtering also employ
signature based packet parsing to detect malicious packets. Deep
packet inspection forms the core of these security devices, which
parses the packet payload against the signatures.

matching. In [14], Yusuf et al. have used hardware sharing at the
bit level to exploit logic design optimizations, thereby reducing
the die size by a further 30%. Other work [23, 24, 25, 26, 27]
presents several alternate string matching architectures; their
performance and space efficiency are summarized in [14].
In [1], Sommer and Paxson note that regular expressions can be
fundamentally more efficient and flexible as compared to exactmatch strings in specifying attack signatures. The flexibility of
regular expressions arise due to the high degree of expressiveness
achieved by using character classes, union, optional elements, and
closures, while the efficiency is due to the effective schemes to
perform pattern matching. Open source NIDS systems, such as
Snort and Bro, already use regular expressions to specify rules.
Regular expressions are also the language of choice in several
commercial security products, including TippingPoint X505 [20]
from 3Com and a family of security appliances from Cisco
Systems [21]. Although some specialized parsers such as RegEx
from Tarari [22] report packet scan rates up to 4 Gbps, the
throughput of most such devices remains limited to sub-gigabit
rates. There is great interest in and incentive for achieving multigigabit performance on regular expressions based rules.
Consequently, several researchers have recently shown interest in
specialized hardware-based architectures which implement finite
automata using fast on-chip logic. Sindhu et al. [15] and Clark et
al. [16] have implemented NFAs on FPGA devices to perform
regular expression matching and were able to achieve very good
space efficiency. Implementing regular expressions in custom
hardware was first explored by Floyd and Ullman [18], who
showed that an NFA can be efficiently implemented with a
programmable logic array. Moscola et al. [17] have used DFAs
instead of NFAs and demonstrated significant improvement in
throughput although their datasets were limited in terms of the
total number of expressions.

In deep packet inspection, every byte of the packet payload is
scanned to identify a match against a set of signatures which are
essentially predefined patterns. Traditionally, the signatures in the
NIDS systems have been specified as exact match strings which
comprise of the known patterns of interest. Naturally, due to their
wide adoption and importance, several algorithms have been
proposed, which can economically perform string matching at
high speeds. Some standard string matching algorithms are AhoCorasick [7] Commentz-Walter [8], and Wu-Manber [9]; these
algorithms use a preprocessed data-structure, which are optimized
to parse the input data at high speeds. Recent research literatures
have primarily focused on enhancing these algorithms and fine
tune them for the networking applications. In [11], Tuck et al.
have presented a technique to enhance the worst-case performance
of Aho-Corasick algorithm. The algorithm was guided by the
analogy between string matching and IP lookup and applies
bitmap and path compression to optimize the data-structure. They
were able to reduce the memory required for the string sets used
in NIDS by up to a factor of 50 while also improving the
performance by more than 30%.

While an ASIC architecture appears promising in meeting the
demands of networking applications, ASICs necessitates memory
reduction techniques. In this context, Yu et al. [10] have proposed
an efficient algorithm to partition a large set of regular
expressions into multiple groups, such that overall space needed
by the automata is reduced dramatically. They also propose
architectures to implement the grouped regular expressions on
both general-purpose processor and multi-core processor systems,
and demonstrate an improvement in throughput of up to 4 times.
The recently proposed delayed input DFA (D2FA) [34] enables a
high degree of memory compression and uses a collection of
embedded memories to achieve high parsing rate. However, these
mechanisms require large “per flow” parse state.

Many researchers have come up with high-speed pattern matching
hardware architectures. In [12] Tan et al. presents an efficient
algorithm to convert an Aho-Corasick automaton into multiple
binary state machines, thereby reducing the memory requirements.
In [13], the authors present an FPGA-based architecture which
uses character pre-decoding coupled with CAM-based pattern

3. Regular Expressions in Networking

While the ASIC architectures appear to accommodate current
regular expressions, it is not clear, how they will scale in future.
This concern arises due to the fact that the size of a DFA may
increase exponentially with the number and complexity of rules.
Therefore, it is important to propose solutions, which are more
scalable and efficient in implementing regular expressions.

Any implementation of regular expressions in networking has to
deal with several complications. The first complication arises due
to multiplexing of packets in the network links. Since packets
belonging to different flows can arrive interspersed with each
other, any pattern matcher has to de-multiplex these packets and

reassemble the data stream of various flows before parsing them.
As a consequence, the architecture must maintain the parse state
after parsing any packet. Upon a switch from a flow x to a flow y,
the machine will first store the parse state of the current flow x
and load the parse state of the last packet of the flow y.

•

Consequently, it is critical to limit the parse state associated with
the pattern matcher because at high speed backbone links, the
number of flows can reach up to a million. NFAs are therefore not
desirable in spite of being compact, because they can have a large
number of active states. With several active states, the space and
bandwidth needed to load and store the “per flow parse state” may
become a performance bottleneck. On the other hand, in a DFA
based machine, a single state is active at any point in time; thus
the amount of parse state remains small.

For the signatures containing multiple closures, a composite DFA
often undergoes severe state explosion. We identify three main
factors which causes these state explosions.

The second complication arises due to the high network link rates.
In a 10 Gbps network link, a payload byte usually arrives every
nano-second. Thus, a parser running at 1GHz clock rate will have
a single clock cycle to process each input byte. NFAs are unlikely
to maintain such parsing speeds because they often require
multiple state traversals for an input byte; thus DFAs appear to be
the only resort. Due to these complications, one can conclude that
a pattern matching machine for networking applications must
satisfy these dual objectives i) fast parsing rates or few transitions
per input byte, and ii) less “per flow” state.
Although, DFAs appear to meet both of these goals, they often
suffer from state explosion, i.e. the total number of states in a
DFA can be exponential in the length of the regular expression. In
fact, typical sets of regular expressions containing hundreds of
patterns for use in networking yield a DFA with hundreds of
thousands of states, limiting their practical use. For complex rules
used in current intrusion detection systems (e.g. Snort), a DFA
may require several millions of states and the construction of such
DFA is generally difficult. Consequently, it is important to
develop methods to represent regular expressions which are fast
as well as compact. Before we attempt to develop these methods,
we must understand what properties of the regular expressions
signatures lead to the state explosion in the resulting DFA.

3.1 Current Regular Expressions
In order to better understand the properties of the regular
expressions used in current systems, we evaluate the signatures
used in the Cisco’s NIDS, and Snort/Bro NIDS. While our prime
focus remains NIDS signatures, we also consider rules used in
Linux layer-7 application protocol classifier [28] and Extensible
Markup Language (XML) filtering applications. We find that the
XML applications use simple regular expressions (without many
closures and character classes), while rest of the systems use
moderately complex regular expressions. Below, we summarize
the key differences in these regular expressions sets.
•

•

In contrast to the signatures used in Snort/Bro, the signatures
used in Cisco comprise of a large number of character
classes. This is primarily because the Cisco patterns are caseinsensitive. Note that character classes alone do not lead to
state explosion; they only increase the number of transitions.
Snort/Bro signatures contain length restrictions on several
characters classes. These length restrictions not only lead to a
state blowup in a DFA, but also lead to a large number of
states in a NFA. In contrast, the XML and Cisco IPS patterns
contain very few length restrictions.

A large fraction of signatures in the Snort/Bro, Linux L7 and
XML filter begins with “^” as opposed to the Cisco
signatures. Signatures which do not begin with a “^”
implicitly contain a “.*” in the beginning, and only such
patterns are likely to incurs extreme state explosions.

3.2 Three Key Problems of Finite Automata
In this section, we introduce the three deficiencies of traditional
finite automata based regular expressions approach:
1. Traditional regular expressions implementations often employ
the complete signatures to parse the input data. However, in NIDS
applications, the likelihood that a normal data stream completely
matches a signature is low. Traditional approach therefore appears
wasteful; rather, the tail portions of the signatures can be isolated
from the automaton, and put to sleep during normal traffic and
woken up only when they are needed. We call this inability of the
traditional approach Insomnia. The number of states in a machine
suffering from insomnia may unnecessarily bloat up; the problem
becomes more severe when the tail portion is relatively complex
and long. We present an effective cure to insomnia in section 4.
2. The second deficiency, which is specific to DFAs, can be
classified as Amnesia. In amnesia, a DFA has limited memory;
thus it only remembers a single state of parsing and ignores
everything about the earlier parse and the associated partial
matches. Due to this tendency, DFAs may require a large number
of states so that it can track the progress of both the current match
as well as any previous partial match. In spite of the fact that
amnesia keeps the per flow state maintained during the parsing
small, it often causes an explosion in the number of states,
because a separate state is required to indicate every possible
combination of partial match. Intuitively, a machine which has a
few bytes of memory in addition to its current state of execution
can utilize this memory to track multiple matches more efficiently
and avoid state explosions. We propose such a machine in section
5, which efficiently cures DFAs from amnesia.
3. The third deficiency of the finite automata can be tagged with
the label Acalulia, due to which finite automata (both NFA and
DFA) are unable to efficiently count the occurrences of certain
sub-expressions in the input stream. Thus, whenever a regular
expression contains a length restriction of k on a sub-expression,
the number of states required by the sub-expression gets
multiplied by k. With length restrictions, the number of states in a
NFA increases linearly, while in a DFA, it may increase
exponentially. It is desirable to construct a machine which, unlike
a finite automaton, is capable of counting certain key events, and
uses this capability to avoid the state explosion. We propose such
machines in section 6.
We now proceed with our cures to these three deficiencies. Our
first solution, attempts to cure finite automaton from insomnia.

4. Curing DFA from Insomnia
Traditional approach of pattern matching constructs an automaton
for the entire regular expression (reg-ex) signature, which is used
to parse the input data. However, in NIDS applications, normal
flows rarely match more than first few symbols of any signature.

Thus, the traditional approach appears wasteful; the automaton
unnecessarily bloats up in size as it attempts to represent the entire
signature even though the tail portions are rarely visited. Rather,
the tail portions can be isolated from the automaton, and put to
sleep during normal traffic conditions and woken up only when
they are needed. Since the traditional approach is unable to
perform such selective sleeping and keeps the automaton awake
for the entire signature, we call this deficiency insomnia.
In other words, insomnia can be viewed as the inability of the
traditional pattern matchers to isolate frequently visited portions
of a signature from the infrequent ones. Insomnia is dangerous
due to two reasons i) the infrequently visited tail portions of the
reg-exes are generally complex (contains closures, unions, and
length restrictions) and long (more than 80% of the signature),
and ii) the size of fast representations of reg-exes (e.g. DFA)
usually increases exponentially with the length and complexity of
an expression. Thus, without a cure from insomnia, a DFA of
hundreds of reg-exes may become infeasible or will require
enormous amounts of memory.
An obvious cure to insomnia will essentially require an isolation
of the frequently visited portions of the signatures from the
infrequent ones. Clearly, frequently visited portions must be
implemented with a fast representation like a DFA and stored in a
fast memory in order to maintain high parsing rates. Moreover,
since fast memories are less dense and limited in size, and fast
representations like DFA usually suffer from state blowup, it is
vital to keep such fast representations compact and simple.
Fortunately, practical signatures can be cleanly split into simple
prefixes and suffixes, such that the prefixes comprise of the entire
frequently visited portions of the signature. Therefore, with such a
clean separation in place, only the automaton representing the
prefixes need to remain active at all times; thereby, curing the
traditional approach from insomnia by keeping the suffix
automaton in a sleep state most of the times.
There is an important tradeoff involved in such a prefix and suffix
based pattern matching architecture. The general objective is to
keep the prefixes small, so that the automaton which is awake all
the time remains compact and fast. At the same time, if the
prefixes are too small then normal data streams will match them
very often, thereby waking up the suffixes more frequently than
desired. Notice that, during anomalous conditions the automaton
representing the suffixes will be triggered more often; however,
we discuss such scenarios later. Under normal conditions, the
architecture must therefore balance the tradeoff between the
simplicity of the fast automaton and the dormancy of the slow
automaton.
We refer to the automaton which represents the prefixes as the
fast path and the other automata as the slow path. Fast path
remains awake all the time and parses the entire input data stream,
and activates the slow path once it finds a matching prefix. There
are two expectations. First, the slow path should be triggered
rarely. Second, the slow path should process a small fraction of
the input data; hence it can use a slow memory technology and a
compact representation like a NFA, even if it is relatively slow. In
order to meet these expectations, we must ensure that the normal
data streams either do not match the prefixes of the signatures or
match them rarely. Additionally, even after a prefix match, the
slow path processing should not continue for a long time. The
likelihood that these two expectations will be met during normal

traffic conditions will depend directly upon the signatures and the
positions where they are split into prefixes and suffixes. Thus, it is
critically important to decide these split positions and we describe
our procedure to compute these in the next section.

4.1 Splitting the regular expressions
The dual objectives of the splitting procedure are that the prefixes
remain as small as possible, and at the same time, the likelihood
that normal data matches these prefixes is low. The probability of
matching a prefix depends upon its length and the distribution of
various symbols in the input data. In this context, it may not be
acceptable to assume a uniform random distribution of the input
symbols (i.e. every symbol appears with a probability of 1/256)
because some words appear much more often than the others (e.g.
“HELO” in an ICMP packet). Therefore, one needs to consider a
trace driven probability distribution of various input symbols [6].
With these traces, one can compute the matching probability of
prefixes of different lengths under normal and attack or
anomalous traffic. This probability will establish the rate at which
slow path will be triggered.
In addition to the “matching probabilities”, it is important to
consider the probabilities of making transitions between any two
states of the automaton. This probability will determine how long
the slow path will continue processing once it is triggered. These
transition probabilities are likely to be dependent upon the
previous stream of input symbols, because there is a strong
correlation between the occurrences of various symbols, i.e. when
and where they occur with respect to each other. The transition
probabilities as well as the matching probabilities can be assigned
by constructing an NFA of the regular expressions signatures and
parsing the same against normal and anomalous traffic.
More systematically, given the NFA of each regular expression,
we determine the probability with which each state of the NFA
becomes active and the probability that the NFA takes its different
transitions. Once these probabilities are computed, we determine a
cut in the NFA graph, so that i) there are as few nodes as possible
on the left hand side of the cut, and ii) the probability that states
on the right hand side of the cut is active is sufficiently small. This
will ensure that the fast path remains compact and the slow path is
triggered only occasionally. While determining the cut, we also
need to ensure that the probability of those transitions which
leaves some NFA node on the right hand side and enters some
other node on the same side of the cut remains small. This will
ensure that, once the slow path is triggered, it will stop after
processing a few input symbols. Clearly, the cut computed from
the normal traffic traces and from the attack traffic are likely to be
different, thus the corresponding prefixes will also be different.
We adopt the policy of taking the longer prefix. Below, we
formalize the procedure to determine cuts in the NFA graphs.
Let ps : Q → [0, 1] denote the probability with which the NFA
states are active. Let the cut divides the NFA states into a fast and
a slow region. Initially, we keep all states in the slow region; thus
the slow path probability p is
ps . Afterwards, we begin

∑

moving states from the slow region to the fast region. The
movements are performed in a breadth first order beginning at the
start state of the NFA, and those states are moved first, whose
probabilities of being active are higher. After a state s is moved to
the fast region, ps[s] is reduced from the slow path probability p.
We continue these movements, until the slow path probability, p

becomes smaller than ε, the slow processing capacity threshold.
This method gives us the first order estimate of the cut between
the fast and the slow path. Such a cut will ensure that the slow
path processes only ε fraction of the total bytes in the input
stream. The procedure is pseudo-code form described below.
For a large majority of the signatures which are used in the current
systems, this method will cleanly split the regular expressions into
prefix and suffix portions. However, for certain types of regular
expressions, the above method will not result into a clean split.
For instance an expression ab(cd|ef)gh. may be cut at the
states which corresponds to the locations of the prefix abc and
abe. We propose to split such types of expressions by extending
the prefixes until a clean split of the expression is possible. Thus,
in the above example, we will extend the cut to the states which
corresponds to the prefix abcd and abef; thus the prefix portion
will become ab(cd|ef) and the suffix will be gh.
procedure find-cut(nfa M(Q, q0, δn, A, Σ), map ps : state→[0,1]);
(1) heap h;
(2) map mark: state→bit;
(3) set state fast;
(4) float p =
ps ;

∑

(5) h.insert(q0, ps(q0));
(6) do h ≠ [ ] and p > ε ⇒
(7)
state s := h.findmax(); h.remove(t);
(8)
mark[s] = 1; fast = fast U s; p = p – ps(s);
(9)
for char c ∈ Σ ⇒
(10)
for state t ∈ δn(s, c) ⇒
(11)
if not mark[t] ⇒ h.insert(t, ps(t)); fi
(12)
rof
(13) rof
(14) od
end;
The above splitting procedure would provide a method to split the
reg-ex signatures into a fast path and a slow path. The method
first attempts to keep the combined probability of the states in the
fast path very high compared to that of the slow path. At the same
time, during the fast path construction, it selects only those states
that have high activation probabilities compared to others. Thus
both of our objectives are fulfilled: the slow path is triggered
rarely and it remains active only for a short duration.

4.2 The bifurcated pattern matching
With the mechanism to split the regular expressions into prefixes
and suffixes in place, we are now ready to proceed with the
description of our bifurcated pattern matching architecture. The
architecture (shown in Figure 1) consists of two components: fast
path and slow path. The fast path parses every byte of each flow
and matches them against the prefixes of all reg-exes. The slow
path parses only those flows which have found a match in the fast
path, and matches them only against those suffixes, whose
corresponding prefixes are matched.
Notice that, the parsing of input data is performed on a per flow
basis. In order to keep parsing of each flow discrete, the “per flow
parse state” has to be stored. With millions of active flows, parse
states have to be stored in an off-chip memory, which may create
a performance bottleneck because upon any flow switch we will
have to store and load this information. With the minimum IP
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Figure 1: Fast path and slow path processing in a
bifurcated packet processing architecture.
packet size being 40 bytes, we may have to perform this load and
store operation every 40 ns at 10 Gbps link rates. Thus, it is
important to minimize the “per flow parse states”. Specifically,
this minimization is critical in the fast path because all flows are
processed by the fast path. It does not pose a similar threat to the
slow path simply because it processes a fraction of the payload of
a small number of flows.
Consequently, the fast path automaton has two objectives: 1) it
must require small per flow parse state, and 2) it must be able to
perform parsing at high speed, in order to meet the link rates. One
obvious solution which will satisfy this dual objective is to
construct a single composite DFA of all prefixes. A composite
DFA will have only one active state per flow and will also require
only one state traversal for an input character. Thus, if there are C
flows in total, we will need C × statef memory, where statef is the
bits needed to represent a DFA state. At this point in discussion
we will proceed with a composite DFA in the fast path, later in
section 5, we will propose an alternative to a composite DFA
which is more space efficient and yet satisfies our dual objectives.
Slow path on the other hand handles, say ε fraction of the total
number of bytes processed by the fast path. Therefore, it will need
to store the parse state of εC flows on an average. If we keep ε
small, then unlike the fast path, we neither have to worry about
minimizing the “per flow parse state” nor do we have to use a fast
representation, to keep up with the link rates. Thus, a NFA may
suffice to represent the slow path. Nevertheless the slow path
offers another key advantage, i.e. we do not have to construct a
composite automaton for all suffixes because we need to parse the
flows against only those suffixes whose prefixes have been
matched. Thus, we can keep separate automaton for each suffix,
which will alleviate the state explosion problems to a large extent
and we can easily construct a separate DFA for each suffix.
However, there is a complication in the slow path. Slow path can
be triggered multiple times for the same flow, thus there can be
multiple instances of per flow active parse states even though we
may be using a DFA. Consider a simple example of an expression
ababcda, which is split into ab prefix and abcda suffix, and a
packet payload ”xyababcdpq”. The slow path will be triggered
twice by this packet, and there will be two instances of active
parse states in the slow path. In general it is possible that i) a
single packet triggers the slow path several times, in which case
signaling between the fast and slow path may become a bottleneck
and ii) there are multiple active states in the slow path, which will
require complicated data-structures to store the parse states.
These problems will exacerbate when the slow path will process
packets much slower than the fast path and will handle its triggers
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Figure 2: NFA and the cut between prefix and suffix
sequentially. For instance, with the above packet, the slow path
will be triggered first after the fast path parses ”xyababcdpq”
and second after ”xyababcdpq”. Upon first trigger, the slow
path will parse the packet payload ”xyababcdpq” and stop
after it sees p. Upon second trigger, it will parse the packet
payload ”xyababcdpq”, thus effectively repeating the previous
parse. Due to these complications, we propose a packetized
version of the bifurcated packet processing architecture.

4.3 Packetized bifurcated pattern matching
The objective of the packetized bifurcated packet processing is to
minimize the signaling between the fast path and the slow path.
More specifically if we ensure that the fast path triggers the slow
path at most once for every packet, then the slow path will not
repeat the parsing of the same packet payload. This objective can
be satisfied by slightly modifying the slow path automaton, so that
it parses the packets against the entire signature, and not just the
suffixes. With the slow path representing the entire signature, the
subsequent triggers for this signature will be captured within the
slow path, since the corresponding prefix states of the signature
will also be present in the slow path automaton. Hence, all
subsequent triggers for this packet and this signature can be
ignored. Notice that having entire signatures represented by the
slow path is not likely to lead to state space explosion, because
slow path maintains separate DFA for different signatures, and
need not maintain a composite DFA.
In order to better understand how the slow path is constructed and
how it is triggered, let us consider a simple example. Let there be
three signatures:
r1 = .*[gh]d[^ij]*[ij]e
r2 = .*fag[^i]*i[^j]*j
r3 = .*a[gh]i[^l]*[ae]c
The NFA for these signatures are shown in figure 2 (a composite
DFA for these signatures will contain 92 states). In the figure, the
probabilities with which various NFA states are activated are also
highlighted. A cut between the fast and slow path is also shown
which divides the states so that the cumulative probability of the
slow path states is less than 5%.
With this cut, the prefixes will be p1 = [gh]d[^ij]*[ij]; p2 =
f; and p3 = j[gh] and the corresponding suffixes will be s1 = e;
s2 = ag[^i]*i[^j]*j; and s3 = i[^l]*[ae]c. As highlighted
in the same figure, fast path consists of a composite DFA of the
three prefixes p1, p2, and p3, which will have only 14 states, while
the slow path comprises of three separate DFAs, one for each
signature r1, r2, and r3, rather than just the suffixes s1, s2, and s3.

Figure 3: DFA and start state for r1 in the slow path
Whenever the fast path will find a matching prefix, say pi in a
packet, it will trigger the corresponding slow path automaton
representing the signature ri. Once this automaton is triggered, all
subsequent triggers corresponding to the prefix pi for the signature
ri can be ignored because during the process of matching ri in the
slow path, such triggers will also be detected. Thus, for any given
packet processed in the fast path, the state of the slow path “active
or asleep” associated with each signature is maintained, so that the
subsequent triggers for any given signature can be masked out.
However, we have to be careful in initiating the of triggering the
slow path automaton representing any signature ri. Specifically,
we have to ensure that the slow path automaton begins at a state
which indicates that the prefix pi of the signature ri has already
been detected. Consider the DFA for the first signature (r1) of the
above slow path, shown in Figure 3. Instead of beginning at the
usual start state, 0 of this DFA, we begin its parsing at the state
(0,1,3), which indicates that the prefix p1 has just been detected;
the parsing continues from this point onwards in the slow path.
In general case, the start state of the slow path automaton will
depend upon the fast path DFA state which triggers the slow path.
More specifically, the slow path start state will be the minimal one
which encompasses all partial matches in the fast path.
The above procedure describes how we initiate the slow path
automaton for a prefix match in any given packet. The decision
that the slow path should remain active for the subsequent packets
of the flow depends on the state of the slow path automaton at
which the packet leaves it. If this final DFA state comprises any of
the states of the slow path NFA, then the implication is that the
slow path processing will continue; else the slow path will be put
to sleep. For example, in the Figure 3, unless the final state upon a
packet parsing is either (0,1,3) or (0,5), the subsequent packets of
the flow will not be parsed by this automaton; in other words this
automaton will no longer remain active.
Let us now consider the parsing of a packet payload ”gdgdgh”.
The fast path state traversal is illustrated below; the slow path will
be triggered twice, but the second trigger will be ignored.
g
d
g
d
g
h
0
→
0,1 
→
0,2 
→
0,1,3 
→
0,2 
→
0,1,3 
→
0,1
↑
↑
r1
r1

Upon the first trigger, the slow path DFA (shown in Figure 3) for
the signature r1 will begin its execution at the state (0,1,3) and
will parse the remaining packet payload ”dgh”. The parsing will
finish at the DFA state (0, 1). Since this state does not contain any
of the states of the slow path NFA, this slow path automaton will
be put to sleep. On the other hand if the remaining packet payload
were ”dge”, the packet would leave the slow path in the state
(0,5). Thus, in this case, the slow path processing will remain
active for the subsequent packets of the flow.
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Figure 4: Fast path and slow path processing in a bifurcated packet and byte based processing architectures.
In contrast with the previous byte based pattern matching
architecture, the proposed packetized architecture has a drawback
that it keeps the slow path automaton active until the packet is
completely parsed in the slow path. Thus, the slow path may end
up processing many more bytes, unlike in the byte level
architecture. This drawback arises due to the difference in the
processing granularity; the byte based pattern matcher will halt
the slow path as soon as the next input character leads to a suffix
mismatch, whereas the packetized pattern matcher will retain the
slow path active till the last byte of the packet is parsed.
Nevertheless, the packetized architecture maintains the triggering
probability at a much lower value, since the recurrent signaling of
prefixes belonging to the same signature is suppressed.
Let us experimentally evaluate the performance of the packetized
pattern matching architecture against the byte level architecture.
Both architectures are likely to operate well when the input traffic
is benign and the slow path is triggered with very low probability,
say 0.01%. Therefore, we consider an extreme situation where the
1% of the contents of the input data stream consists of the entire
signatures. Thus, the triggering probability of the slow path will
be around 1%. We use 36 Cisco signatures whose average length
is 33 characters, and assume that packets are 200 bytes long. In
Figure 4, we plot a snapshot of the timeline of the triggering
events, and the time intervals during which the slow path is active.
It is apparent that slow path in the packetized architecture remains
active for relatively longer durations. Consequently, the signatures
have to be split accordingly in the packetized architecture, so that
the slow path will handle such loads.

4.4 Protection against DoS attacks
In bifurcated packet processing architecture, a small fraction of
packets from the normal flows might be diverted to the slow path,
even though a normal data stream is not likely to match any
signature. The slow path processing is provisioned in a way that it
can sustain the rate at which such false packet diversions from
normal flows occur. Therefore, it is highly unlikely, that these
packets from the normal flows will overload the slow path.
However, there may exist flows whose profile will be different
from the typical normal traffic. In other words, these data streams
may frequently match the prefixes, but not the corresponding
suffix. Such flows are likely to overload the slow path by
triggering it more often than desired. Additionally, there can be
malicious flows, which will match the entire signature. These
flows are also likely to trigger the slow path very frequently.
The key inference here is that, an attacker can mimic either of
these two classes of flows, and send large volumes of data, which
the slow path might not be provisioned to handle. This opens up a
possibility to overload the slow path, and deny service to those
normal flows, which accidentally divert some packets to the slow

path. Such denial of service scenarios will also appear under
anomalous traffic conditions, like worm/virus outbreak, wherein a
large number of packets may again be diverted to the slow path.
A denial of service attack, in fact is much more threatening to the
end-to-end data transfer. Consider a packet from a normal flow
getting diverted to the slow path. If the slow path is overloaded,
then this packet will either get discarded or encounter enormous
processing delays. If the sending application retransmits this
packet, it will further exacerbate the overload condition in the
slow path. The implication on the end-to-end data transfer is that
it may never be able to deliver this packet, and complete the data
transmission. This clearly signals a need to protect these normal
flows from such repeated packet discards. To accomplish this
objective, we need some mechanism in the slow path to
distinguish such packets of normal flows from the packets of the
anomalous or attack flows, which are overloading the slow path.
We now propose a lightweight algorithm which performs such
classification at very high speed and with high accuracy.
Our algorithm is based upon statistical sampling of packets from
each flow. For each flow, we compute an anomaly index which is
a “moving average” of the number of its packets which matches
one of the prefixes in the fast path. The moving average can either
be a “simple moving average (SMA)” or an “exponential moving
average (EMA)”. For simplicity we only consider the SMA,
wherein we compute the average number of packets which
matches some prefix over a window of n previous packets. We
call a flow well-behaving, if less than ε fraction of its packets
finds a match, simply because such a flow will not overload the
slow path. Flows which find more matches are referred to as
anomalous. If the sampling window n is sufficiently large, then
the anomaly indices of the well-behaving flows are expected to be
much smaller than those of the anomalous/attack flows. However,
longer sampling windows will require more bits per flow to
compute the anomaly index. Consequently there is a trade-off
between the accuracy of the anomaly indices and the “per flow”
memory needed to maintain them. We attempt to strike a balance
between this accuracy and the cost of implementation.
Let us say that we are given with at most k-bits for every flow to
represent its anomaly index. Since a flow is declared anomalous
as soon as its anomaly index exceeds ε, we set ε as the upper
bound of the anomaly index. Thus, when all k-bits are set, it
represents an anomaly index of ε. Consequently, the per flow
sampling window, n comprises of 2k/ε packets; for every packet
which matches a prefix, the k-bit counter is incremented by 1/ε
and for other packets it is decremented by 1 (note that a flow is a
threat only if more than ε fraction of its packets are diverted to the
slow path, or the mean distance between packets which are
diverted is smaller than 1/ε packets). Thus, the probability that a
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Figure 5: Fast path and slow path processing in a
bifurcated packet processing architecture.
flow which indeed is anomalous is not detected will be O(e–n). If ε
is 0.01, then 8-bit anomaly counter will result in a false detection
probability of well below 10–6. This analysis assumes that the
events of packet diverts to the slow path is uniformly distributed.
In case of any other distribution, the accuracy of the detection of
anomalous flows is likely to improve while the probability that a
normal flow is falsely detected as anomalous may also increase.

Flow throughput. DoS protection

Throughput, no DoS protection

Slow path load

The anomaly counters in fact, indicates the degree to which a flow
loads the slow path. Consequently, they can be used to classify
not just the anomalous flows but also the well behaving flows.
The flows can be prioritized in the slow path according to the
degree of their anomaly; the implication being that the slow path
will first process the flows with smaller anomaly indices. The
slow path thus consists of multiple queues which will store the
requests from various flows according to their anomaly indices.
Queues associated with smaller anomaly indices are serviced with
higher priority. Hence, even if a well behaving flow accidentally
diverts its packets to the slow path, it will be serviced quickly in
spite of the presence of large volumes of anomalous packets.
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Having described the procedure to split the reg-ex signatures into
simple prefixes and relatively complex suffixes as well as
mechanisms needed to put the suffix portions to sleep, we are now
ready to discuss some further issues. In these pattern matching
architectures, the first issue is that it often becomes critical to
prevent a receiver from receiving a complete signature. This has
an interesting implication on the bifurcated architecture.
Whenever a packet is diverted to the slow path, no subsequent
packets of the same flow can be forwarded in the fast path, until
the slow path packet is completely processed. If this policy is not
adhered to, then signatures that span across multiple packets
might not be detected. This indicates that in any flow, if a packet
is accidentally diverted to the slow path, subsequent packets of the
flow can create a head of line (HoL) blocking in the fast path.
Thus, in order to avoid such HoL blockings, a HoL buffer is
maintained (shown in Figure 5), which stores the packets that can
not be processed currently.
The above discussion again bolsters the premise that the normal
flows must be guarded against anomalous/attack flows which may
overload the slow path. Without such protection, whenever a
diverted packet of a normal flow gets either delayed or discarded
in the heavily loaded slow path, subsequent packets of the flow
cannot be forwarded; thus the flow will essentially become dead.
In case of TCP, the discarded packet will get retransmitted after
the time-out; nevertheless, it will again get diverted to the slow
path, and congestion will ensue.
Since DoS protection is so crucial, we have performed a thorough
evaluation of our DoS protection mechanism, and found that it is
indeed effective in guarding normal flows against attacks from
anomalous traffic. In Figure 6, we summarize the results from a
simulation consisting of 50 flows parsed by a packetized engine
running at 500 Mbps. The simulation begins with none of the
flows exhibiting an anomalous behavior; afterwards 10 flows turn
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Figure 6: Simulation results illustrating the effect of DoS protection mechanism on the throughput of four normal flows.

Our cure from Insomnia appears attractive since it ensures high
average parsing rates, and also guarantees accurate diversion of
anomalous flows to the slow path; thereby, preventing them from
posing a threat to the service received by the well behaving flows.
Additionally, splitting reg-exes into suffix and prefix portions
avoids the state explosions to a large extent. However, since the
prefix portions are compiled into a composite DFA, if a
moderately large number of prefixes contain Kleene closures, then
there may still be a state explosion. As a matter of fact, a few tens
of closures are sufficient to make a composite DFA construction
impractical. These state explosions occur due to Amnesia;
therefore we now proceed with an effective cure to Amnesia.

5. H-FA: Curing DFAs from Amnesia

We introduce the construction and executing of H-FA with a
simple example. Consider two reg-ex patterns listed below:
r1 = .*ab[^a]*c;

r2 = .*def;

These patterns create a NFA with 7 states, which is shown below:
^a

NFA: ab[^a]*c; def

*
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Let us examine the corresponding DFA, which is shown below
(some transitions are omitted to keep the figure readable):
a

a
0,1

a
b
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0,2

^[ad]

d

0

0, 3

c

d

An intuitive solution to avoid such exponential explosions is to
construct a machine, which can remember more information than
just a single state of execution. NFAs fall in this genre; they are
able to remember multiple execution states, thus they avoid state
explosion. NFAs, however, are slow; they may require O(n2) state
traversals to consume a character. In order to preserve the fast
execution, we would like to ensure that the machine maintains a
single state of execution. One way to enable single execution state
and yet avoid state explosion is to equip the machine with a small
and fast cache, which will act as a history buffer and register key
events which may occur during the parse, such as encountering a
closure. Recall that the state explosion occurs because the parsing
get stuck at a single or multiple closures; thus if the history buffer
will register these events then the automaton may avoid using
several states. We call this class of machines History based Finite
Automaton (H-FA).

5.1 Motivating example

d

DFA state explosion occurs primarily due amnesia, or the
incompetence of the DFA to follow multiple partial matches with
a single state of execution. Before proceeding with the cure to
amnesia, we re-examine the connection between amnesia and the
state explosion. As suggested previously, DFA state explosions
usually occur due to those signatures which comprise of simple
patterns followed by closures over characters classes (e.g. .* or [az]*). The simple pattern in these signatures can be matched with a
stream of suitable characters and the subsequent characters can be
consumed without moving away from the closure. These
characters can begin to match either the same or some other regex, and such situations of multiple partial matches have to be
followed. In fact, every permutation of multiple partial matches
has to be followed. A DFA represents each such permutation with
a separate state due to its inability to remember anything other
than its current state (amnesia). With multiple closures, the
number of permutations of the partial matches can be exponential,
thus the number of DFA states can also explode exponentially.

The execution of the H-FA is augmented with the history buffer.
Its automaton is similar to a traditional DFA and consists of a set
of states and transitions. However, multiple transitions on a single
character may leave from a state (like in a NFA). Nevertheless,
only one of these transitions is taken during the execution, which
is determined after examining the contents of the history buffer;
thus certain transitions have an associated condition. The contents
of the history buffer are updated during the machine execution.
The size of the H-FA automaton (number of states and transitions)
depends upon those partial matches, which are registered in the
history buffer; if we judiciously choose these partial matches then
the H-FA can be kept extremely compact. The next obvious
questions are: i) how to determine these partial matches? ii)
Having determined these partial matches, how to construct the
automaton? iii) How to execute the automaton and update the
history buffer? We now proceed with comprehensive discussion
of H-FA which attempts to answer these questions.

a

anomalous and send enough traffic to increase the load to the
slow path’s ε threshold (0.01), thereby saturating it. Eventually,
25 flows become anomalous, completely overwhelming the slow
path. As shown in Figure 6(b), due to such flooding, normal flows
experience packet losses which disrupts their data transfers. In the
next set of experiments, we repeated the simulations with our DoS
protection mechanism enabled. The results highlighted in Figure
6(c) illustrates the effectiveness of the DoS protection; normal
flows experience no packet losses and are able to seamlessly
transfer data even in the presence of heavy anomalous traffic.
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The DFA has 10 states; each DFA state corresponds to a subset of
NFA states, as shown above. There is a small blowup in the
number of states, which occurs due to the presence of the Kleene
closure [^a]* in the expression r1. Once the parsing reaches the
Kleene closure (NFA state 2), subsequent input characters can
begin to match the expression r2, hence the DFA requires three
additional states (0,2,4), (0,2,5) and (0,2,6) to follow this multiple
match. There is a subtle difference between these states and the
states (0,4), (0,5) and (0,6), which corresponds to the matching of
the reg-ex r2 alone: DFA states (0,2,4), (0,2,5) and (0,2,6)
comprise of the same subset of the NFA states as the DFA states
(0,4), (0,5) and (0,6) plus they also contain the NFA state 2.
In general, those NFA states which represent a Kleene closure
appear in several DFA states. The situation becomes more serious
when there are multiple reg-exes containing closures. If a NFA
consists of n states, of which k states represents closures, then
during the parsing of the NFA, several permutations of these
closure states can become active; 2k permutations are possible in

the worst case. Thus the corresponding DFA, each of whose states
will be a set of the active NFA states, may require total n2k states.
These DFA state set will comprise of one of the n NFA states plus
one of the 2k possible permutations of the k closure states. Such an
exponential explosion clearly occurs due to amnesia, as the DFA
is unable to remember that it has reached these closure NFA states
during the parsing. Intuitively, the simplest way to avoid the
explosion is to enable the DFA to remember all closures which
has been reached during the parsing. In the above example, if the
machine can maintain an additional flag which will indicate if the
NFA state 2 has been reached or not, then the total number of
DFA states can be reduced. One such machine is shown below:
a

a
a, flag<=0
0,1

b, flag<=1

c,if flag=1, flag<=0

0, 3

a, flag<=0
0

flag

d

A, δ, H), where Q is the set of states, q0 is the start state, Σ is the
alphabet, A is the set of accepting states, δ is the transition
function, and H is the history set. The transition function δ takes
in a character, a state, and a history state as its input and returns a
new state and a new history state.

δ:Q×Σ×H →Q×H
H-FAs can be synthesized either directly from a NFA or from a
DFA. For clarity, we explain the construction from a combination
of NFA and DFA. To illustrate the construction, we consider our
previous example of the two reg-exes. First, we determine those
NFA states of the reg-exes, which are registered in the history
buffer (generally these are the closure NFA states). The first regex, r1 contains a closure represented by the NFA state 2; hence we
keep a single flag in the history for this state. Afterwards, we
identify those DFA states, which comprise of these closure NFA
states, in this instance the NFA state 2. We call these DFA states
(which are also highlight below) fading states:

d

d
c, flag=0
0,4

d
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f

0,1

↑
↑
reset flag set flag

In the beginning the flag is reset; consequently the machine makes
a move from state (0) to state (0) on the input character c. On the
other hand, when the last input character c arrives, the machine
makes a move from state (0) to state (0,3) because the flag is set
this time. Since the state (0,3) is an accepting state, the string is
accepted by the machine.
Such a machine can be easily extended so that it will maintain
multiple flags, each indicating a Kleene closure. The transitions
will be made depending upon the state of all flags and the flags
will also be updated during certain transitions. As illustrated by
the above example, augmenting an automaton with these flags can
avoid state explosion. However, we need a more systematic way
to construct these H-FAs, which we propose now.

5.2 Formal Description of H-FA
History based Finite Automata (H-FA) comprises of an automaton
and a set called history buffer. The transition of the automaton has
i) an accompanied condition which turns out to be either true or
false depending upon the state of the history, and ii) an associated
action which are inserts into the history set, or removes from set,
or both. H-FA can thus be represented as a 6-tuple M = (Q, q0, Σ,
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This machine makes transitions like a DFA; besides it maintains a
flag, which is either set or reset (indicated by <=1, and <=0 in the
figure) when certain transitions are taken. For instance transition
on character a from state (0) to state (0,1) resets the flag, while
transition on character b from state (0,1) to state (0) sets the flag.
Some transitions also have an associated condition (flag is set or
reset); these transitions are taken only when the condition is met.
For instance the transition on character c from state (0) leads to
state (0,3) if the flag is set, else it leads to state (0). This machine
will accept the same language which is accepted by our original
NFA, however unlike the NFA, this machine will make only one
state traversal for an input character. Consider the parse of the
string “cdabc” starting at state (0), and with the flag reset.

a
b

a

d

because flag is reset

a

a

0, 6

d

0,4

0,2,5

f

0,2,6

d
d
e

0,5

f

0, 6

In the next step, we attempt to remove the NFA state 2 from the
fading DFA states. Notice that, if we will make a note that the
NFA state 2 has been reached by setting the history flag, then we
can remove the NFA state 2 from the fading states subset. The
consequence of removing the NFA state 2 from the fading states is
that these fading states may overlap with some DFA states in the
non-fading region, thus they can be removed. Transitions which
originated from a non-fading state and led to a fading state and
vice-versa will now set and reset the history flag, respectively.
Furthermore, all transitions that remain in the fading region will
have an associated condition that the flag is set. Let us illustrate
the removal of the NFA state 2 from the fading state (0, 2). After
removal, this state will overlap with the DFA state (0); the
resulting conditional transitions are shown below:
a,|2,-2
2
b ,+

a

a
0,1

0

d

d

0, 3

c,|2,-2
d,|2

a

a d
0,4

e

0,2,4

0,2,5

f

0,2,6

d
d
e

0,5

f

0, 6

Here a transition with “|s” means that the transition is taken when
history flag for the state s is set; “+s” implies that, when this
transition is taken, the flag for s is set, and “-s” implies that, with
this transition, the flag for s is reset. Notice that all outgoing
transitions of the fading state (0,2) now originates from the state
(0) and has the associated condition that the flag is set. Also those
transitions which led to a non-fading state resets the flag and
incoming transitions into state (0,2) originating from a non-fading
state now has an action to set the flag. Once we remove all states
in the fading region, we will have the following H-FA:

0,1

0, 3

a,|2,-2
a

0

d
d,|2

FA, and allow each of the k closures to be represented by flags in
the history buffer, then the blowup in the number of conditional
transitions will depend directly upon c2.

a

a

a,|2,-2
b,+2
a

c,|2,-2

d

d
0,4

d

d
e
e,|2

0,5

f
f,|2

0, 6

Notice that several transitions in this machine can be pruned. For
example the transitions on character d from state (0) to state (0,4)
can be reduced to a single unconditional transition (the pruning
process is later described in greater detail). Once we completely
prune the transitions, the H-FA will have a total of 4 conditional
transitions; remaining transitions will be unconditional. When
there are multiple closures, then multiple flags can be employed in
the history buffer and the above procedure can be repeatedly
applied to synthesize an H-FA.
The above example demonstrates a general method of the H-FA
construction from a DFA. In order to achieve the maximum space
reduction, the algorithm should only register those NFA states in
the history buffer which appears the maximum number of times in
the DFA states. Thus, if the history buffer has room for say 16
flags, then those 16 NFA states should be identified which appear
most of the times in the DFA states. Afterwards, the above
procedure can be repeatedly applied. With multiple flags in the
history buffer, some transitions may have conditions that multiple
history flags are set. Moreover, some transitions may either set or
reset multiple flags. If there are n flags in the history buffer and h
represents this k-bit vector, then a condition C will be a k-bit
vector, which becomes true whenever all those bits of h are set
whose corresponding bits in C are also set.
The representation of conditions as vectors eases out the pruning
process, which is carried out immediately after the construction.
The pruning process eliminates any transition with condition C1,
if another transition on condition C2 exists between the same pair
of states, over the same character such that the condition C1 is a
subset of the condition C2 (i.e. C2 is true whenever C1 is true) and
the actions associated with both the transitions are the same. In
general, pruning process eliminates a large number of transitions,
and it is essential in reducing the memory requirements of H-FAs.
However, even after pruning, there can be a blowup in the number
of transitions. In the worst-case, if we eliminate k NFA states from
the DFA by employing k history flags then there can be up to 2k
additional conditional transitions in the resulting H-FA, thus there
will be little memory reduction. However, such worst-cases are
rare; normally there is only a small blowup in the number of
transitions. We now present a brief analysis of these blowups.

5.3 Analysis of the transition blowup
Consider a set k of regular expressions each containing a closure.
Let the ith expression is denoted by

r1i c0i [c1i ]* c2i r2i , where r1c0

and c2r2 are prefix and suffix parts of the expression; here the
closure is over set of characters denoted by c1, c0 denotes the set
of character preceding the closure and c2 denotes the set of
characters following the closure. For such expression, if c1
contains a large number of characters, then there is likely to be a
state blowup in the DFA. On the other hand, if we construct an H-

First, if none of the c2’s overlaps with each other, then there will
be at most one conditional transition per character per state and in
total there will be up to k conditional transitions per state. On the
other hand, when there c2’s are overlapping then there may be an
exponential blowup in the number of conditional transitions.
To better understand the nature of the transition blowup, let us
consider the transitions leaving DFA state (i,j,k), which comprises
of three NFA states. We assume that the NFA states i corresponds
to a closure and needs to be represented by a history flag. Let the
closure is over a character set c1, and the character set which
progresses the parsing ahead of the closure is c2. If we remove the
NFA state i from all DFA states then the state (i,j,k) may be
merged with a pre-existing DFA state (j,k). Let the transition on
character c from state (i,j,k) leads to state (p,q,r). For c ∈ c1, p
must be i; p may differ from i only when c ∈ c2 or c ∉ c1. Hence,
after i is removed from the DFA states, the newly added
conditional transitions from the state (i,j) over characters c ∈ c1
will be identical to the original transitions from state (i,j); hence
they will be removed during the pruning process. Only those
conditional transitions will remain, which are over the characters
c ∈ c2 or c ∉ c1. In situations when there are multiple closures,
i

and character sets c2 , over which parsing progresses ahead of the
closure are overlapping, then we may have to consider multiple
permutations of the conditional transitions. For instance, if each

c2i

is {a} then there can be up to 2k conditional transitions over
the character a, and the conditions will be the status of each
possible combination of the k closure flags in the history buffer.
The actions (insert/remove from history) associated with the
conditional transitions will depend upon the characteristics of c0
and c1. Flags will be set by the transitions over character c0, while
they will be reset by transitions on characters not from the set c1.
Thus, if c0 and c1 are small, then only a few transitions will have
an associated action. If we examine the regular expressions used
in practical signatures, the sets c0 and c2 are usually small, thus
the H-FA will be extremely effective is reducing the number of
state. On the other hand, the set c1 is large; hence, there will be
minimal blowup in the number of conditional transitions. We
present detailed results of the nature of H-FA constructed from
current reg-ex signatures in section 7; here we resume with the
discussion of certain concerns with the hardware implementations
of H-FA’s history buffer and conditional transitions.

5.4 Implementing history buffer and
conditional transitions
We have seen that, if there is no overlap between the sets of the
characters for which the parsing progresses ahead of the closure,
then a state will have at most two transitions on any character, one
unconditional, and another conditional. When certain characters
of these sets are overlapping, say t-times then there may be up to
2t conditional transitions per state over that character. In most of
our experiments, t remains smaller than 3. Thus, there are at most
8 conditional transitions per state. In rare situations, where t is
greater than 3, we split the reg-ex sets into multiple sets, so that t
becomes smaller than 3, thus keeping the number of conditional
transitions at 8.

With up to 8 transitions per state per character per state, they can
be stored at contiguous memory locations, and can be fetched in a
single memory access. For 16K states, 16-bits will represent a
transition, and for 16-bit history buffer, conditions and actions
can be represented with 32-bits, thus 6-bytes will represent a
conditional transition, and 48-byte wide logical memory will be
sufficient. With multiple embedded memories available in FPGA
devices, such logical bus widths can be easily achieved. In an
ASIC system, where memory bus width can be custom tailored,
such bus widths can be achieved effortlessly.
Once the conditional transitions are fetched from the memory, the
next step involves the selection of the appropriate transition. This
selection will depend upon the contents of the history buffer. First
those transitions are filtered out whose condition do not satisfy (a
condition is false if some flag bits which are set in the condition,
are not set in the history); notice that the unconditional transition
are never filtered. Afterwards, from among remaining transitions,
the one which has the maximum number of flags set, is selected.
Note that there will never be a tie (multiple conditional transitions
with equal number of flags set). In terms of the hardware cost, the
logic to compute if the conditions are met or not will require k
gates per condition, and the logic to decide among the chosen
transitions will require k adders, log2k priority encoders, and a few
gates to glue them together. In total, the circuitry will require less
than 1000 gates for a 16-bit history buffer; thus it will be able to
make decisions in a few nano-seconds (there will be roughly
2log2k+3 gates in the critical path).

5.5 Summarizing H-FAs
H-FAs appear to efficiently cure a DFA from amnesia so that the
state explosion can be avoided. In one way, H-FAs are similar to a
NFA, in that the total complexity of the machine is O(k), where k
is the maximum number Kleene closures. However, there is no
straightforward way to partition a NFA into two components such
that the processing complexity of the first component is O(1) but
requires a moderately large space (hence stored in memory), while
the second component has a processing complexity of O(k) but
can be stored more compactly (hence stored in on-chip logic). HFA achieves this objective and efficiently partitions the problem
into two such components: the automaton requires a single state
traversal per character, while the history buffer is extremely
compact (up to a few bytes). Additionally, H-FA also avoids state
explosions in the automaton; hence the entire machine can be
stored on-chip, which may yield very high parsing rates. While
the benefits of H-FA appear convincing, we will now show that, a
slightly modified version of the H-FA also cures the traditional
finite automata based reg-exes implementations from acalulia.

6. H-cFA: Curing DFAs from Acalulia
We now propose “History based counting finite Automata” or HcFA, which efficiently cures traditional FA from acalulia, due to
which a FA is unable to efficiently count the occurrences of
certain sub-expressions. We again introduce H-cFA with an
example; we consider the same set of two reg-exes with the
closure in the first reg-ex replaced with a length restriction of 4, as
shown below:

r1 = .*ab[^a]4c;

r2 = .*def;

A DFA for these two reg-exes will require 20 states. The blowup
in the number of states in the presence of the length restriction
occurs due to acalulia or the inability of the DFA to keep track of

the length restriction. Let us now construct an H-cFA for these
reg-exes. The first step in this construction replaces the length
restriction with a closure, and constructs the H-FA, with the
closure represented by a flag in the history buffer. Subsequently
with every flag in the history buffer, a counter is appended. The
counter is set to the length restriction value by those conditional
transitions which set the flag, while it is reset by those transitions
which reset the flag. Furthermore, those transitions whose
condition is a set flag are attached with an additional condition
that the counter value is 0. During the executing of the machine,
all positive counters are decremented for every input character.
The resulting H-cFA is shown below:
a

a
a; flag<=0
0,1

b; flag<=1,
ctr<=4

c;if flag=1 & ctr=0; flag<=0

0, 3

a; flag<=0

ctr

0
d
c; if flag=0
or ctr≠ 0

d

if (ctr >0)
decrement

d

d
d
0,4

e

0,5

f

0, 6

d

Consider the parse of the string “abdefdc” by this machine
starting at the state (0), and with the flag and counter reset.
because flag = 1 and ctr = 0

a
b
d
e
f
d
c
(0) →
(0,1) →
(0) →
(0,4) 
→
(0,5) →
(0,6) →
(0,5) 
→
(0,3)

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

flag<=1;ctr <= 4

ctr <=3

ctr <=2

ctr <=1

ctr <=0

flag<=0

As the parsing reaches the state (0,1), and makes transition to the
state (0), the flag is set, and the counter is set to 4. Subsequent
transitions decrements the counter. Once the last character c of the
input string arrives, the machine makes a transition from state
(0,5) to state (0,3), because the flag is set and counter is 0; thus
the string is accepted. This example illustrates the straightforward
method to construct H-cFAs from H-FAs. Several kinds of length
restrictions including “greater than i”, “less than i” and “between i
and j” can be implemented. Each of these conditions will require
an appropriate condition with the transition. For example, “less
than i” length restriction will require that the conditional
transition becomes true when the history counter is greater than 0.
From the hardware implementation perspective, a greater than or
less than condition requires approximately equal number of gates
needed by an equality condition, hence different kinds of length
restrictions are likely to have identical implementation cost. In
fact, a reprogrammable logic can be devised equally efficiently,
which can check each of these conditions. Thus, the architecture
will remain flexible in face of the frequent signature updates. This
simple cure to acalulia is extremely effective is reducing the
number of states, specifically in the presence of long length
restrictions. Snort signatures comprises of several long length
restrictions, hence H-cFA is extremely valuable in implementing
these signatures. We now present our detailed experimental
results, where we highlight the effectiveness of our cures to the
three reg-ex problems.

7. Experimental Evaluation
We have carried out a comprehensive set of experiments in order
to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed cure to the three
problems, insomnia, amnesia, and acalulia. Our primary signature
sets are the regular expressions used in the security appliances

Table 1. Splitting results: Left columns show the properties of complete reg-ex, while right columns show the properties of prefixes
Source

# of rules

Regular expressions implementation before split
Avg.
# of
# of length Number Total
ASCII closures restrictions of DFA memory
length

Cisco

68

44.1

70

15

6

Regular expressions prefix features after split
Avg.
ASCII
length

# of
closures

# of length
restrictions

973 MB

19.8

19

1

Number of
Total
DFA
memory
1

152 MB

Linux

70

67.2

31

0

4

30.7 MB

21.4

11

0

2

15.8 MB

Bro

648

23.64

0

0

1

3.77 MB

16.1

0

0

1

1.23 MB

Snort rule 1

22

59.4

9

11

5

114.6 MB

36.9

6

6

3

32.1 MB

Snort rule 2

10

43.72

11

10

2

64.2 MB

16

1

2

1

6.5 MB

Snort rule 3

19

30.72

8

6

N/A

N/A

13.8

5

1

2

2.42 MB

from Cisco Systems [33]. These rule sets comprise of more than
750 moderately complex regular expressions. Cisco often uses
DFAs to implements these rules; consequently, due to the state
explosion, they employ more than a gigabyte of memory; still the
parsing rates remains sub-gigabits/s. We also considered the regex signatures used in the open source Snort and Bro NIDS, and in
the Linux layer-7 application protocol classifier. Linux layer-7
protocol classifier comprises of 70 rules, while Snort rules
consists of more than a thousand and half reg-exes. In Snort, these
reg-exes need not be matched simultaneously, because before a
packet is parsed, it is classified, and based upon the classification,
only a subset of the reg-exes are considered. Therefore, we only
group those Snort signatures which correspond to the overlapping
header rules, i.e. those header rules which a single packet can
match (we present results of three such groups). For the Bro
NIDS, we present results for the HTTP signatures, which contain
648 reg-exes.
Since Cisco rules comprise of a large number of patterns, our first
step in implementing them involves grouping these rules into two
sets: one consisting of all those signatures which do not contain a
closure, while the second containing all signatures with at least
one closure. Clearly, the first set can be compiled into a composite
DFA without any difficulty. It is the second set of reg-exes, which
are problematic and requires our cure mechanisms; therefore all
our results are over these signatures. First we present the result of
our splitting algorithm, which cures the rg-ex implementations
from insomnia.

7.1 Reg-ex splitting results
For reg-ex splitting, our representative experiment sets the slow
path packet diversion probability at 1%, and computes the cut in
the reg-exes. Our normal traffic traces were derived from the MIT
DARPA Intrusion Detection Data Sets [29], while the anomalous
traffic traces were provided to us by Cisco Systems. We have also
created synthetic anomalous traces, by inserting some signatures
into the normal traffic trace. With these traces, we have split the
reg-exes into prefixes and suffixes. Afterwards the prefixes are
extended by one or two more characters to ensure that slow path

remains substantially less loaded. We summarize the result of the
splitting process on the reg-exes in Table 1.
In this table, we first list the properties of the original reg-exes
and the memory needed to implement them. Notice that most of
these reg-ex sets are sub-divided into multiple sets. Each set is
compiled into a separate DFA, because it is difficult to compile all
reg-exes into as a single composite DFA (due to state explosion).
The implication of this sub-division is that since each DFA is
executed simultaneously, the parsing rate for a given memory
bandwidth will reduce. In the same table, on the right hand side,
we list the properties of the prefixes after the splitting. Notice that
these prefixes can be compiled into fewer DFAs, which will yield
higher parsing rates and less per flow state. Additionally, these
DFAs are relatively compact however their memory requirements
are still much higher compared to the current embedded memory
densities. The prime reason is that the prefixes still contain a small
number of closures which lead to a moderate state explosion. We
now present the results of our cure to amnesia, which avoids such
state explosion in the prefix automaton.

7.2 H-FA and H-cFA construction results
For the prefixes of the reg-exes, we construct H-FAs, which
dramatically reduces the total memory requirement. Snort rules
comprise of several long length restrictions therefore we construct
H-cFAs for these prefixes. We find that H-cFA is extremely
effective in keeping the memory small; without employing the
counting capability of H-cFA, the composite automaton for Snort
prefixes explodes in size. In Table 2, we present the results from
our representative set of experiments. Here, we explicitly
highlight the number of flags and counters that we employ in the
history buffer. For Cisco rules, we also show how varying the
number of flags affects the H-FA size. In general, with more
history flags, the H-FA is much more compact. Notice that the
traditional DFA compression techniques including the D2FA [34]
can also be applied to H-FA, thereby further reducing the
memory. The results also show that H-FAs always requires a
single composite automaton as opposed to the DFA approach,
which may require multiple automaton. This not only improves
the parsing speed of H-FA, but also reduces the “per flow state”.

Table 2. Results of the H-FA and H-cFA construction, there results are for the prefix portions of the reg-exes
Source

# of
closures, #
of length
restriction

DFA

Composite H-FA / H-cFA

# of
automata

total # of
states

# of
flags in
history

# of
counters
in history

Cisco64

14, 1

1

132784

6

0

3597

2

Cisco64

14, 1

1

132784

13

0

1861

8

682718

96.77

-

Cisco68

19, 1

1

328664

17

0

2956

8

1337293

97.03

-

Snort rule 1

6, 6

3

62589

5

6

583

8

238107

97.40

3x

Snort rule 2

1, 2

1

12703

1

2

71

2

27498

98.58

-

Snort rule 3

5, 1

2

4737

5

1

116

4

46124

93.48

2x

Linux70

11, 0

2

20662

9

0

1304

8

546378

81.63

2x

The table also highlights an important result: the blowup in the
number of conditional transitions in the H-FA generally remains
very small. In a DFA there are 256 outgoing transitions, while in
most of the H-FAs there are less than 500. Thus, there is less than
2x blowup in the number of transitions; on the other hand
reduction in the number of states is generally a few orders of
magnitude, thus the net effect is significant memory reduction.
Due to space restrictions, we are currently unable to present
further details of the H-FA and H-cFA construction.

Total # Max # of Total # of
of states transitions / transitions
character

[5]

[6]

[7]
[8]
[9]

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed several mechanisms to enhance
the performance of regular expressions parsers. First we have
identified three key limitations of the traditional finite automata
based approach, which have been categorized as insomnia,
amnesia and acalulia. Afterwards, we have proposed solutions to
cure each of these limitations. Our solutions are orthogonal with
respect to each other; hence they can be employed in unison.

[10]

Based upon experiments which were carried out on real signatures
drawn from a collection of widely used networking systems, we
have shown that our solutions are indeed very effective. More
specifically, our solutions can reduce the memory requirements of
today’s state-of-the-art regular expressions implementations by up
to 100 times, while simultaneously enabling a two to three fold
increase in the packet throughput. To conclude, we have paid
adequate attention to several complications which appears in real
networking systems and links. We believe that our proposed
bifurcated architecture with DoS protection can implement
network intrusion detection and prevention systems much more
securely and economically and improve throughput and scalability
in the number of signatures.

[13]
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